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Recently, we proposed a classical communicator which was inspired by the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-
like-Noise (KLJN) communicator and was claimed totally secure. Here we withdraw this claim and
prove that, similarly to earlier intuitive suspicions, a wave-based classical communicator can never
be totally secure.
Because the propagating wave divides the two communicators, they cannot be considered
as a single organic physical system anymore. Moreover, because the signal is classical
physical quantity, it is possible to measure it. The eavesdropper (Eve) can use directional
couplers to measure the signal parameters of the waves propagating in both directions in
the channel. Therefore, Eve can compare the wave entering into Alice's communicator
and the wave leaving Alice's communicator. This is enough information to identify
Alice's logic state if enough time is available. The same is true for Bob. If there is not
enough time, the logic state of Alice and Bob can be estimated with certain probability
and that means that there is a non-zero information leak toward Eve, therefore the
communicator is not totally secure.
In an unpublished work by authors from the Airforce, some more fundamental
problems are claimed which may indicate that these proposed solutions [1,2] are not
secure at all. In the work, the authors say that, if such method could be secure than these
methods could work simply via a regular emailing process by sending the wave
parameters as numbers. Alice would receive the numbers from Bob and she would use
the theoretical optical system response to calculate her response (outgoing signal)
numbers. Bob would do the same with the numbers received from Alice. If such an email
communicator would work, even with a limited-but-designable security, no
physical/hardware secure communicator would ever been needed any more. We note here
that this unpublished Airforce paper was written up against the KLJN communicator [3],
however the paper was turned down because in the KLJN communicator the wave limit is
excluded [3], and Alice and Bob are part of an organic single physical system, thus the
Airforce objection does not work there.
Solution [2] has another problem. A careful check indicates that there is no propagating
information. This property was hidden for the author at the beginning. Therefore we have
two reasons to withdraw this paper/claim.
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